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JURY TRIAL-JUVENILE COURT
the Standard Juvenile Court Act, and the Legisla-
tive Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court
Acts-all of which fail to recommend jury trials
for juveniles.9'
There is some existing authority contrary to the
Court's position. A few courts, both state and
federal, have concluded that the fourteenth
amendment guaranteed juveniles the right to trial
by jury.91 Particularly noteworthy is a recent, post-
McKeiver decision of the Alaska Supreme Court
which unanimously held that juveniles were to be
accorded the right to trial by jury.1 The Alaska
court based its decision upon the similarity between
juvenile and criminal proceedings-possible in-
carceration and stigmatization--and their recog-
nition that public trials would discourage arbitrari-
ness or casualness during the proceedings.93 The
10 UNIFORM: JUVENIE COURT ACT § 24(a); STANDARD
JUVENILE COURT ACT art. V, § 19; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
CHTTDREN'S BUREAU, SOCIAL & REHABILITATIVE SERV-
ICE, LEGIsLATIvE GUIDE FOR DRAFTING FAMILY AND
JuVENILE COURT ACTS § 29(a) (1969). See W. SHERI-
nAN, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 73(1968).
91 Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968);
Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); RLR v. Alaska, 487 P.2d 27 (Alas. 1971), noted
in CCH Pov. L. RPTm., 13,528 (1971).
1
2 Although the Alaska Supreme Court relied on the
due process requirements of the Alaska constitution, the
opinion hinted disagreement and dissatisfaction with
the Supreme Court's result in MaKeiver. 487 P.2d at
30-32. Furthermore, the language of the Alaska Consti-
tution and the United States Constitution does not
differ noticeably. Id. at 29-30.93Id. at 32.
National Crime Commission Report, cited by
Blackmun, suggested that the informal procedural
atmosphere of the juvenile court might pose a
substantial barrier to the effective treatment ol
young offenders whose sense of justice was offended
by the seemingly all-powerful judge.9 4 Indis-
putably, both tradition and authority strongly
substantiate the Court's conclusion, but the
existence of contrary authority at least indicates
continued experimentation with the juvenile trial
concept.
The McKeiver case, viewed in historical context,
appears to signal the end of the Supreme Court's
involvement in the reshaping of state juvenile
court systems. The further extension of con-
stitutional safeguards into the adjudicative phase
of state delinquency proceedings is unlikely, since
McKeiver effectively reverses the trend established
by Kent, Gault and Winship. The Court's holding
seems to implicitly embody a judicial determina-
tion that while existing juvenile systems may suffer
from severe shortcomings, these problems should
not be attacked from the highest level of judicial
decision-making. Indeed, the express failure of the
plurality to come to grips with the Court's previous
rationale in the juvenile and jury trial cases clearly
suggests the emergence of different judicial con-
cerns. As a result, existing state practices have bien
left unchanged and the states can probably expect
little future judicial interference with the me-
chanics of their respective juvenile systems.
94 NAT'L. CreME Comu'N. REPORT 85; see note 82
supra.
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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)
The Supreme Court has consistently held that in
order for a guilty plea to be valid it must represent
the voluntary and intelligent act of a defendent. In
Herman v. Claudy1 a unanimous Court held that a
conviction based on a coerced plea of guilty vio-
lated a defendant's right to due process. 2 In so
deciding, the Court recognized that a guilty plea
1350 U.S. 116 (1956).
2 Mr. Justice Black, writing for the unanimous court
in Herman said that in circumstances in which defend-
ant's rights could not have been protected in the ab-
sence of counsel, "[Ilt is entirely possible that peti-
tioner's prior confession caused him, in the absence of
counsel... to plead guilty." Id. at 122.
may be coerced by an unintelligent waiver of right
to counsel and under such circumstances the
coerced plea of guilty must be considered invalid.
In United States v. Jackson the Court expanded
its scrutiny of guilty pleas. In Jackson, the peti-
tioner challenged a section of the Federal Kidnap-
ping Act which provided a maximum penalty of
death for any defendant who did not either plead
guilty or obtain a bench trial.4 The Court, in invali-
3 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
418 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1964), The Federal Kidnapping
Act, stated:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate com-
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dating and severing that section of the Act, rea-
soned that the effect of the provision was to en-
courage a defendant to choose between exercising
his fifth and sixth amendment rights, and his fear
of receiving the death penalty. The result of such
an enforced choice was to discourage the assertion
of these rights. The Court said:
If the provision had no other purpose or effect
than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights
then it would be patently unconstitutional. [T]he
evil in the federal statute is not that it coerces
guilty pleas and jury waivers, but simply that it
encourages them.5
It was this encouragement, or coercion, upon a
defendant's freedom to decide whether he would or
would not plead guilty that was struck down by the
majority in Jackson.6
Two later decisions continued this trend toward
thorough examination of guilty pleas. In McCarthy
v. United States7 the Court invalidated a plea of
guilty which had been accepted by a trial judge
who had failed to comply with the procedures pro-
vided for in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure." In so doing, the Court mandated
merce any person who has been unlawfully seized,
confined, .... and held for ransom or reward or
otherwise.., shall be punished (1) by death if the
kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed,
and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend,
or (2) by the imprisonment for any term of years or
for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.
Thus, the defendant who pleads guilty or who obtains a
bench trial is able to escape the risk of the death pen-
alty.
5390 U.S. at 581, 583.
6In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the
Court held that the California procedure of permitting
the prosecutor to comment on the defendant's failure to
testify violated the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination. Mr. Justice Douglas, for the majority,
concluded that the procedure compelled the accused to
testify against himself, stating:
It [the commenting] is a penalty imposed by courts
for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts
down on the privilege by making its assertion
costly.
Id. at 614.
It may be argued that by analogizing Grifin to the pro-
cedure in Jacksim, any petitioner who was forced or
coerced into entering a plea of guilty was penalized by
the Court in a manner similar to that in Griffin.
7394 U.S. 459 (1969).
8 FxD. R. Ctium P. 11 states:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or with
the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The Court
may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not
accept such a plea or a plea of no contendere with-
out first addressing the defendant personally and
determining that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the nature and the consequences
of the plea.... The Court shall not enter a judge-
that full compliance with Rule 11 must precede
acceptance of guilty pleas by federal judges. The
Court required compliance with the rule because:
A defendant who enters such a plea [guilty] simul-
taneously waives several constitutional rights,
including his privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his
right to confront his accuser. Consequently, if a
defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary
and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of
due process and is therefore void. [emphasis
added] 9
A second case, Boykin v. Alabama,"° extended the
McCarthy mandate to the states.
-However, recent changes in the composition of
the Court seem to have resulted in a change in the
Court's examination of guilty pleas. In Brady v.
United States," McMann v. Richardson,12 and
Parker v. North Carolina," the Court held generally
that a defendant who pleads guilty with the advice
of competent counsel, notwithstanding the fact
that the plea may have been motivated by a
coerced confession or by fear of a harsher sentence,
not only waives his fifth amendment right to de-
mand a jury trial, but may also, in effect, relin-
quish his right to habeas corpus review.4 The Court
ment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that
there is a factual basis for the plea.
In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), the
petitioner's lawyer had answered the pertinent ques-
tions for the defendant. The Court held that Rule 11
must be complied with completely and that in order for
the plea to be valid the judge must address the defend-
ant directly and be satisfied that the accused knows the
nature of the crime and the consequences of his plea.9 Id. at 466.
10 393 U.S. 238 (1969).
11397 U.S. 742 (1970).
12 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
13 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
4 In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) the
defendant was charged with kidnapping and faced a
maximum penalty of death. He first chose to plead not
guilty, then found out that a co-defendant had con-
fessed. He changed his plea and received a thirty-year
sentence. The Court rejected his claim that his plea of
guilty had been coerced by fear of the death penalty,
holding that the plea was both voluntary and intelligen t.
In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), three
defendants' claims that their confessions were coerced
and that their pleas of guilty were the products of the
coerced confessions were considered. Mr. Justice White
recognized that a valid guilty plea must be voluntary
and intelligent but found nothing to indicate that the
pleas, as distinguished from the confessions, were in-
voluntary. In Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790(1970), the defendant was indicted for first-degree
burglary, a capital offense. The Court, relying on Brady,
dismissed Parker's claim that his plea was compelled
by fear of the death penalty, though the death sentence
discourse in Brady was only dicta. Thus, they never
19711
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has raised the assumption that any plea of guilty
rendered with the advice of competent counsel and
in compliance with proper judicial procedure is
voluntary and will most likely be deemed to be
intelligent as well.15 No longer will the Court look
to see whether the circumstances surrounding the
plea indicate the possibility of coercion. The basic
question now is whether the defendant, in light of
all the surrounding circumstances, made a rational
decision.
North Carolina v. Alford16 continues the trend
begun in Brady by even further narrowing the defi-
nitional scope of the terms "voluntary" and "know-
ing." In Afford the defendant plead guilty to a
charge of second-degree murder in order to avoid a
possible death penalty. Despite the guilty plea, the
defendant at all times protested that he was in fact
innocent. The Court found that strong evidence
negated the defendant's claim of innocence and
provided a sound basis for a guilty plea, so that the
defendant, advised by competent counsel, intelli-
gently concluded that he should plead guilty to a
negotiated lesser offense. There was no constitu-
tional error in the trial court's acceptance of the
guilty plea, despite the defendant's claim of inno-
cence.
Alford was indicted for first-degree murder, a
capital offense in North Carolina. While there were
no eyewitnesses to the crime, a strong circumstan-
tial case was made by the state.17 Conviction under
the North Carolina statute could result in a maxi-
mum penalty of death, but, if the accused plead
guilty and the plea was accepted by the prosecution
and the court, the maximum sentence imposed
reached Parker's challenge to the North Carolina stat-
ute. Parker's claim that his coerced confession had
forced him to plead guilty was dismissed on the basis of
McMann.
15 The opinions in McMann, Brady, and Parker seem
to have overlooked a standard for the waiver of consti-
tutional rights established many years before in John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In Johnson the Court
held that for a waiver of constitutional rights to be ef-
fective it must be an "intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right." Id. at 464. This stand-
ard emphasizes "free choice" of a defendant in a con-
text of uncoerced exercise of the rational faculties of a
defendant. In McMann, Brady, and Parker the Court
seemed to assume that the decisions of the defendants
were free and voluntary acts of informed men.
16 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
17 The prosecution alleged that it had witnesses who
would testify to having overheard an argument between
Alford and the dead man during which Alford threat-
ened the life of the deceased. Alford was also unable to
account for his whereabouts at the time of the murder.
There was further circumstantial evidence which on
the whole seemed to point to Alford's guilt.
would be life imprisonment. 8 The prosecution
agreed to a charge of second-degree murder in ex-
change for a plea of guilty. Upon advice of 6,
Alford plead guilty to the inferior charge. At the
time of sentencing Alford protested that he had not
committed the murder, but that he was pleading
guilty to avoid the death penalty. He stated that:
I pleaded guilty on second-degree murder because
they said that there is too much evidence, but I
ain't shot no man, but I take the fault for the
other man. We never had no argument in our life
and I just pleaded guilty because they said if I
didn't they would gas me for it, and that is all.19
Alford was denied relief in a state post-conviction
hearing, and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was denied by both the district court and a federal
circuit court judge. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit accepted Alford's petition20 on the
basis of United States v. Jackson,2 1 which Alford
alleged invalidated the North Carolina statute. 2
2
Alford claimed that his plea was the product of fear
and coercion, and that the North Carolina statute
had forced him to plead guilty at the expense of
his constitutional rights to a trial by jury, freedom
from self-incrimination, and his right to confront
his accusers. The divided circuit panel, relying
18 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17 (1953):
Murder in the first and second degree defined:
punishment.-A murder which shall be perpetrated
by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment,
starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall
be committed in the perpetration or attempt to
perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or
other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the
first degree and shall be punished with death: Pro-
vided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in open
court, the jury shall so recommend, the punishment
shall be imprisonment for life in the State's prison,
and the court shall so instruct the jury. [emphasis
added]
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-16 2.1(a)-(b) (1965):
An accused who pleads guilty to one of the four
capital crimes is to be sentenced to life imprison-
ment.
The provision permitting guilty pleas in capital cases
was repealed in 1969. Though under present North
Carolina law it is siut possible to plead guilty to a capital
charge, it seemingly remains possible for a person
charged with a capital offense to plead guilty to a lesser
charge.
10400 U.S. at 25 n. 2.
10 Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340 (1968).
.1 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
2 The same statutory structure had been questioned
in Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). The
North Carolina courts in Parker and in Alford refused
to consider whether the statute was unconstitutional
under United States v. Jackson. The Supreme Court, in




primarily on Jackson, held that Alford's plea was
involuntary, the product of a statutory scheme
similar to that which had been expressly rejected
by the Supreme Court in Jackson. The majority of
the panel said that:
Jackson held invalid the death penalty provision
of the Federal Kidnapping Act on the basis that it
had a chilling effect upon the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial, and the Fifth-Amendment
right "not to plead guilty"... [Wihile the instant
case, a state prosecution, concerns the Fourteenth
Amendment... the test of what violates the
Fourteenth Amendment in this area is the same.Y
The Supreme Court, Mr. justice White writing
the opinion for the majority,24 reversed the decision
of the Fourth Circuit. The Court's decision was ad-
dressed to Alford's two primary contentions.
Afford's first claim was that the Court's decision in
Un~ited States v. Jackson had rendered the North
Carolina statutory scheme which had produced his
plea of guilty unconstitutional, and therefore his
plea was coerced and invalid. Mr. justice White re-
jected this claim, though never expressly mention-
ing the statute.
We held in Brady v. United States... that a plea
of guilty which would not have been entered except
for the defendant's desire to avoid a possible death
penalty and to limit the maximum penalty to life
imprisonment or a term of years was not for that
reason compelled within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. Jackson established no new test for
determining the validity of guilty pleas. The
standard was and remains whether the plea repre-
sents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action open to the defend-
ant.25
Thus, the Court rejected Alford's claim that Jack-
son had rendered the North Carolina statute un-
constitutional. 26 In speaking to the question of
whether the statute had forced Alford's plea of
2405 F.2d at 343.
24 Mr. Justice White was also the Court's spokesman
in .illcMann, Brady, and Parker. Mr. Justice Brennan
spoke for the dissenters in McMann, Brady, Parker,
and Alford.
25 400 U.S. at 31.
26 The Court never directly held that the North Car-
olina statute was not unconstitutional, rather they held
that under Brady the plea was not coerced by the
statute and that Jackson had not, by itself, had the ef-
fect of rendering the statute unconstitutional. The
Court seemingly avoided the issue of the statute itself,
but the decision is based upon the implicit assumption
that the statute in itself was not coercive and therefore
the plea was valid.
guilty and in answering Alford's contention that
the state should not have allowed him to so plead,
the Court said:
The States in their wisdom may take this course
by statute or otherwise and may prohibit the
practice of accepting guilty pleas to a lesser offense
under any circumstances. But this is not the
mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment and Bill
of Rights.27
In effect, Mr. Justice White said that Jackson is not
applicable to the States, and that in the considera-
tion of guilty pleas precedence will be given to the
standards established in McCarthy and interpreted
in Brady. The result of this-is to make Jackson ap-
plicable only in a federal case of similar circum-
stances.ss In fact, Mr. justice White said that had
this been the only issue raised by Alford in his ap-
peal, the Court would have, "without more,"
vacated the Court of Appeal's decision. 9
Alford's second claim was that because his origi-
nal plea of guilty was coerced, he never expressly
admitted his guilt, and, since a plea of guilty
ordinarily subsumes not only the plea but also an
admission of guilt, his plea is invalid. The question
for the Court was whether a plea of guilty without
an express admission of guilt may be constitu-
tionally accepted. The Court had not previously
been confronted with this precise issue. Mr. Justice
White likened Alford's plea to one of nolo conten-
dere. Relying on Huadson v. United States ° he said
that:
Implicit in the nolo contendere cases is a recognition
that the Constitution does not bar imposition of a
prison sentence upon an accused who is unwilling
expressly to admit his guilt, but who, faced with
grim alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and
accept the sentence. 1
The fact that Alford's plea was one of guilty and
not nolo contendere was considered to be of no con-
27400 U.S. at 39.
2 Ultimately, the Court's reliance on the practical,
administrative needs of the criminal jusffce system and
its eagerness to encourage plea bargaining call into
question any continuing validity of Jackson.
29 400 U.S. at 31.
30 272 U.S. 451 (1926). Petitioners contested their
sentences of one year and one day upon their pleas of
nolo contendere to charges of mail fraud and conspir-
acy to use the mails to defraud. Writing for a unanimous
Court, Mr. Justice Stone stated: "Like the implied
confession, this plea [nolo contendere] does not create an
estoppel, but, like the plea of guilty, it is an admission
of guilt for the purposes of the case." Id. at 455.
31400 U.S. at 36.
1971]
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stitutional significance. The result is that an express
admission of guilt is not a constitutional prerequi-
site to sentencing.
After determining the fact that Alford would be
sentenced without an express admission of guilt,
and that the North Carolina statute was not uncon-
stitutional, Mr. Justice White said that because of
the strength of the state's case and the possibility
that he could face a more severe sentence if con-
victed after trial, Alford's decision to plead guilty
was a rational one and the plea is valid.2
The effects of the Alford decision may be ana-
lyzed in different ways. In Mr. Justice White's view
the concept of voluntariness has not been changed
by this case and the Brady, McManm, and Parker
decisions. The test of "voluntariness" under such a
reading is whether the defendant's plea was ra-
tional in regard to his alternative courses of ac-
tion.n Mr. Justice White cautioned in his opinion:
The prohibitions against involuntary or unintel-
ligent pleas should not be relaxed, but neither
should an exercise in arid logic render those
constitutional guarantees counter productive and
put in jeopardy the very human values they were
meant to preserve.Y
However, the dissenters in McMann, Brady, and
Parker had argued that the concept of voluntari-
ness had been replaced by Mr. Justice White's re-
quirement of an opportunity to make a rational
choice between a trial and a plea of guilty. As de-
fined by Mr. Justice Brennan:
[I]nvoluntary has traditionally been applied to
situations in which an individual, while perfectly
capable of rational choice, has been confronted
with factors which the government may not con-
stitutionally inject into the decision making
process.3s
11 It is assumed that the guilty plea is generally the
result of bargaining between the defendant and the
State and it is this plea bargaining process that the
Court in Alford is attempting to insulate and promote.
Mr. Justice White seems to regard this plea bargaining
process and the ultimate plea of guilty as part of a
rational, voluntary decision-making procedure on the
part of the defendant and in his own best interest.
33 One commentator has remarked regarding Justice
White's opinions in McMann, Brady, and Parker that:
the rhetoric of his opinions is laden with references
to admissions of guilt and admissions that the de-
fendant committed the crime. Foreword-The
Supreme Court Review, 84 HtAv. L. REv. 20 (1970).
In any case, it would seem necessary that the State put
forth at least some evidence of the likelihood of the de-
fendant's having been involved in the crime charged in
order to insulate the plea from collateral attack.
3 400 U.S. at 39.
"5 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970)
It is clear that there has been a change from the
Herman v. Claudy determination of voluntariness
in terms of
[Wihether, under all the circumstances of the case,
the pressures brought to bear on the defendant
were sufficient to render a plea involuntary.s
This change has come in the removal by the Court
of factors previously considered to be coercive. A
plea must still be voluntary, but the Court has
manipulated this concept to mean "rational" and
rational means "in spite of" coercive factors, not in
regard to them.3
Alford may be viewed as simply removing one
more factor, the express admission of guilt. In re-
moving this factor the Court also goes one step
further in holding that allegedly coercive factors
do not entitle the petitioner to habeas corpus relief,
especially if the prosecutor has made it clear on the
record that the defendant made a seemingly "good
deal." It may be argued that the combination of
Brady, McMann, Parker and Alford with the
McCarthy-Boykin rule renders it almost impossible
for most petitioners to receive a hearing on the
validity of their guilty plea. Mr. Justice Brennan's
dissent in McMann would still seem appropriate.
The Court moves yet another step toward the
goal of insulating all guilty pleas from subsequent
attack no matter what unconstitutional action of
the government may have induced a particular
plea.u
And in his dissent in Alford, Mr. Justice Brennan
made it clear just how far he thought the Court
had gone.
Today the Court makes clear that its previous
holding was intended to apply even when the
record demonstrates that the actual effect of the
unconstitutional threat was to induce a guilty plea
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Bi'ennan also
argued that the decision of the Court in Parker was in-
consistent, since, in his opinion, "the defect in the North
Carolina statutory scheme was more serious than that
in the statute considered in Jackson, for under the Fed-
eral Kidnapping Act a defendant at least had a po-
tential opportunity to avoid the death penalty and
have his guilt determined in a bench trial." Id. at 813.
Brennan's position is that if it can be shown that the
unconstitutional procedure substantially contributed
to the plea of guilty, the plea is invalid.
36 350 U.S. at 116.
37 Arguments against the constitutionality of plea
bargaining may be found in Note, The Unconstitution-
ality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HA.v. L. Rv. 1387 (1970).
31397 U.S. at 775. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 62
